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Abstract: In the first ever commentary on the Groundwork, one of Kant’s earliest critics, Gottlob August Tittel, 
argues that the categorical imperative is not a new principle of morality, but merely a new formula. This 
objection has been unjustly neglected in the secondary literature, despite the fact that Kant explicitly responds 
to it in a footnote in the second Critique. In this paper I seek to offer a thorough explanation of both Tittel’s 
‘new formula’ objection and Kant’s response to it, as well as illustrate its significance. I argue that the 
objection is in fact the third step in a line of argument that Tittel presents in his commentary, and that the 
objection is best understood within this context. I analyze Kant’s response in the second Critique footnote 
line-by-line so as to show that Kant both clarifies that it was never his aim to offer a new principle, but only 
‘establish’ the principle that common human reason already implicitly employs. Furthermore, I show that 
Kant uses the opportunity to clarify the sense in which the categorical imperative is a ‘formula [Formel]’, 
namely as a representation of a complicated and abstract principle, like the moral law, in a way that is easier to 
understand and apply. I conclude by illustrating the fourth step in Tittel’s line of argument, which makes the 
overall significance of the ‘new formula’ objection clear: for Tittel, the problem is not that Kant seems to be 
offering merely a new formula, but that the categorical imperative lacks a foundation. 
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Kant’s first critics, reviewers, and commentators were profoundly important for the 
subsequent development and presentation of his Critical philosophy. To cite just one important 
example of the immediate reception of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the first substantial review of 
the Critique of Pure Reason was the infamous Göttingen review, written by Christian Garve and then 
heavily edited by J.G.H. Feder, which subsequently encouraged Kant to clarify the ways in which his 
transcendental idealism differed from Berkeleyan idealism in the Appendix to the Prolegomena.1 The 
immediate reception of Kant’s moral philosophy was equally important for its later shape and 
                                                        
1 For a helpful discussion of this and many of the other first reviews and criticisms of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy, see B. Sassen, Introduction, in Kant’s Early Critics: The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 1-52. 
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presentation. Heiner Klemme has argued, for example, that «in none of the other critical writings 
does he [Kant] deal with his critics to such an extent as in the Critique of Practical Reason.»2 Klemme 
even goes on to suggest that Kant may not have written the second Critique (KpV) at all, were it not 
for these early criticisms and replies.3 Given the importance of the first criticisms and responses to 
the moral philosophy and related doctrines that Kant presents in both the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) and the first Critique, it is surprising that these criticisms are only very 
rarely and marginally discussed in the secondary literature. My aim in this paper is to help remedy 
this situation by clarifying the nature and significance of one central objection made by one of 
Kant’s earliest critics who has been especially, but to my mind unjustly, neglected in the secondary 
literature, namely Gottlob August Tittel (1739-1816).  
As Jens Timmermann points out, Tittel is «the Groundwork’s first commentator».4 Just one 
year after the GMS first appeared in 1785, Tittel published the first book-length commentary on it 
entitled: On Kant’s Reform of Moral Science [Über Herrn Kants Moralreform] (hereafter: Reform).5 Many of 
the criticisms presented in this book would go on to be extraordinarily important for Kant’s aims in 
the second Critique and beyond. Although I also discuss some of Tittel’s auxiliary objections in this 
paper, my primary focus is the most famous objection in the book, because Kant responds to it 
directly in the Preface to the second Critique, namely the claim that «the entire Kantian reform of 
moral science […] confine[s] itself to a new formula».6 Kant’s response seems to have sealed Tittel 
an unfortunate fate: just as Kant does in the second Critique, nearly all of the discussions of Kant’s 
response to Tittel in the secondary literature are barely more than a few sentences long, and occur 
almost exclusively in footnotes. This has resulted in an incomplete understanding of both Tittel’s 
                                                        
2 H. Klemme, The Origin and Aim of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A 
Critical Guide, edited by A. Reath and J. Timmermann, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 17. 
3 Ibid. 
4 J. Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, pp. 56. 
5 A note on the translation of Moral in the title: I adopt Timmermann’s suggestion (see Kant, I. Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Edited and Translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, 161) that ‘moral science’ is the best translation for Moral in order to preserve a distinction 
between it and related terms like Sittlichkeit, Moralität, Sitten, Ethik and Moralphilosophie. See also the entry in J. and 
W. Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 16 Bde. in 32 Teilbänden, Leipzig, 1854-1961. Quellenverzeichnis Leipzig 1971, 
pp. 2526-2528, which points out that Moral was sometimes used interchangeably with Sittenlehre, as was done by 
Christian Wolff for example, which confirms that ‘moral science’ is a fitting translation. 
6 G.A. Tittel, Über Herrn Kants Moralreform, Frankfurt and Leipzig, Pfähler, 1786, p. 35 and see KpV, AA V 8n for 
Kant’s reference to this objection. There is no modern edition of Tittel’s commentary. All citations therefore 
reference the original edition of 1786 and all translations are my own. A translation of the most important passages 
from Tittel’s commentary will be included in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: Backgrounds Source Materials. Edited 
with an Introduction by Michael Walschots. Under contract with Cambridge University Press. 
 3 
objection and Kant’s response to it. Accordingly, I have two main aims in the following: first, to 
offer a thorough account of both Tittel’s ‘new formula’ objection and Kant’s response to it, and 
second, to accurately describe the significance of Tittel’s objection.  
The following paper has three sections. In the first section (1.) I illustrate that Tittel’s ‘new 
formula’ objection is in fact the third step of a broader line of thought that he presents in the Reform. 
I begin this section by describing Tittel’s more general empiricist philosophical commitments, which 
lead him to argue that the categorical imperative is empty (step one). I then show that it is on the 
basis of the categorical imperative’s alleged emptiness that, in the spirit of charity, Tittel suggests that 
we interpret the categorical imperative as an empiricist principle in order to give it meaning (step 
two). But if the categorical imperative is an empiricist principle, then Kant’s supposedly new moral 
principle is in fact only a new formulation of a moral principle we are already familiar with (step 
three). In section two (2.) I turn to Kant’s response to this objection. I analyze the second Critique 
footnote, wherein Kant responds to Tittel directly, line-by-line so as to illustrate that there is more to 
Kant’s response than commentators have suggested in the past. Kant responds to Tittel by admitting 
that his aim was never to ‘discover’ a new principle of morality for the very first time, but only to 
‘establish’ the principle that common human reason already implicitly employs. I then illustrate that 
Kant uses the opportunity to clarify his understanding of the concept of a formula [Formel]: for 
Kant, a formula is a way of representing a complex principle, like the moral law, that makes it easier 
to understand and apply. In the third and final section (3.) I return to Tittel and discuss the 
significance of the ‘new formula’ objection. The literature on Kant’s response to Tittel is ambiguous 
and wavers between the suggestion that the new formula objection is shallow and insignificant, 
which is why it warrants only a footnote-length response by Kant, to claims that Tittel is actually 
addressing foundational issues in Kant’s moral philosophy. Although at first glance the objection 
seems quite superficial, I argue that it does in fact reach into the heart of the Groundwork’s project, 
namely the grounding of morality. This is only clear, however, once one understands the fourth and 
final step of the line of thought that Tittel presents the Reform: if the categorical imperative is empty 
but also not an empiricist principle, and thus not merely a new formula, then Tittel argues it is not 
binding on human beings. 
 
1. Empiricism, Emptiness, and the New Formula Objection 
 
1.1 – Tittel’s Empiricism 
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Gottlob August Tittel (1739-1816) first taught philosophy as a lecturer in Jena (1760-64) and 
later as professor in Karlsruhe from 1764 where he also eventually became rector.7 One of his 
achievements during his lifetime was a series of six textbooks entitled Explanations of Theoretical and 
Practical Philosophy According to Feder’s Arrangement [Erläuterungen der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie 
nach Herrn Feder’s Ordnung], published between 1783 and 1786.8 As the title of these textbooks 
indicates, Tittel was an open supporter of Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740-1821), professor of 
philosophy in Göttingen, one of the most well-known ‘popular philosophers’ of the period, and 
editor of the famous Garve/Feder review.9 Tittel modelled the content and style of his works on 
Feder, and both figures were adherents of Locke’s philosophy. Indeed, one of Tittel’s other 
achievements is producing a book of extracts from Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
in German translation in 1791.10  
In line with his empiricist commitments, Tittel is perhaps best known in the history of 
philosophy as an outspoken critic of Kant. Tittel produced two short, book-length reactions to 
Kant’s philosophy. After publishing his response and commentary on the Groundwork in 1786, he 
published a response to the first Critique in 1787 under the title: Kantian Forms of Thought or Categories 
[Kantische Denkformed oder Kategorien]. Tittel’s empiricism is obvious even in the Reform, however. Early 
on in the book, for example, Tittel makes a statement reminiscent of Locke’s blank slate hypothesis: 
 
Without having received the initial material from the senses, the entire operation of thought would 
suddenly stand still. The soul must climb from this most foundational level up to the highest, by 
means of the course that nature has set for it. From the material of experience the highest and most 
dignified concepts are built by means of processing and development. This developmental and 
processing power is reason.11 
                                                        
7 For biographical information on Tittel see A. Thomas 2010, Gottlob August Tittel (1739-1816), in The Bloomsbury 
Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers, edited by H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, London, Bloomsbury, 2016, 
pg. 792-793.; and especially W. Kühlmann, Facetten der Aufklärung in Baden, Freiburg, Rombach, 2009, pp. 15-23. 
8 G.A. Tittel, Erläuterungen der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie nach Herrn Feders Ordnung, Vol. 1: Logik (1783 ); 
Vol. 2 Metaphysik (1784); Vol. 3: Allgemeine Praktische Philosophie (1785); Vol. 4: Moral (1785); Vol. 5: Natur – 
und Völkerrecht (1786); Vol. 6: Abhandlungen über Einzelne wichtige Materien (1786). 
9 On Feder see U. Thiel, Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1749-1821), in in The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century 
German Philosophers, edited by H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, London, Bloomsbury, 2016, pg. 204-207; and H.P. 
Nowitzki, U. Roth, and G. Stiening (Editors), Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740-1821): Empirismus und 
Popularphilosophie Zwischen Wolff und Kant, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018.  
10 Locke vom menschlichen Verstande, zu leichtem und fruchtbarem Gebrauche zergliedert und geordnet, Mannhein, 1791. 
11 Tittel, Reform, p. 19. 
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Tittel goes on to explain how even a concept like God is created merely by reflecting and expanding 
upon our idea of human capacities, which we know through experience.12 For Tittel, all concepts 
must necessarily lead back to experience, because «every abstraction that is not built on this 
foundation is a chimera.»13 Indeed, Tittel indicates that he favours Locke’s «historical, plain 
method»14 of the «empirical origin» of our ideas in experience, as opposed the «unfortunate 
[missliche]» method of those who claim ideas can have an abstract origin.15 
 Tittel’s empiricist epistemological commitments form the background of his critique of 
Kant’s moral philosophy. Given his claim that ideas must have their origin in experience if they are 
not ‘chimeras’, even the concepts of morality and duty must eventually come back to experience in 
the sense that they must be «composites» formed from various experiential components.16 Moral 
rules have their origin in experience as well: 
 
The law is just the general expression, or the abstract entity, wherein what is common to certain 
actions and their consequences is summarized and described out of a multitude of singular cases. 
The general expression, as a formula, both in the theoretical and practical sense (axiom or law), 
always breaks down into the singular concepts and cases, from which they were abstracted; and the 
former reaches not a hair further than the latter.17 
 
From this passage, which suggests that Tittel would be sympathetic to aspects of moral 
particularism, we can start to see the position from which Tittel is approaching Kant’s moral 
philosophy. Sceptical, to say the least, of any concept or idea whose origin cannot be traced back to 
experience, and believing that any moral rule or principle is only the abstraction or generalization of 
particular cases, Tittel would have many questions to ask about «a pure moral philosophy, 
completely cleansed of everything that might be in some way empirical and belongs to 
anthropology» (GMS, AA IV 389) and the idea of a purely a priori moral law.  
                                                        
12 Tittel, Reform, p. 19. 
13 Tittel, Reform, p. 20. 
14 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by P. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon, 1975, I.1.2. 
15 Tittel, Reform, p. 27. 
16 Tittel, Reform, p. 20. 
17 Tittel, Reform, p. 14. 
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 In the Reform, a major part of Tittel’s critique of and reaction to Kant’s moral philosophy can 
be characterized by a line of argument that has four main steps, and the new formula objection is 
made only in the third step if this argument. In the remainder of this section I describe the first three 
steps, before discussing Kant’s response to the new formula objection in the following section. I 
present the fourth and final step of Tittel’s argument in the third section of this paper, which 
illustrates that the overall significance of the new formula objection concerns the ultimate 
foundation of morals. 
 
1.2 – Step One: Empty Formalism 
 
 One of Tittel’s main arguments against Kant’s moral philosophy in the Reform is that, 
without reference to experience, the categorical imperative is meaningless and empty. In an 
important section of the commentary where Tittel discusses Kant’s classification of imperatives18, 
Tittel has the following to say about the categorical imperative:  
 
this law itself, which Herr Kant believes to have found in pure reason, if it is not an entirely empty 
and sterile expression but is to be capable of some application, is entirely empirical with respect to 
its content, i.e. it immediately refers to the consequences and effects that we know from 
experience.19 
 
Tittel’s point in this passage, as he goes on to explain, is that without bringing in experience, which 
tells us what the consequences of making the law universal would be, the categorical imperative does 
not provide us with a usable criterion of moral evaluation and therefore cannot decide the morality 
of maxims. In a passage that is likely the first instance of what has come to be called the ‘logical 
contradiction’ interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law20, Tittel argues that contradiction is 
unhelpful in determining the morality of maxims:  
 
Just as I come not a step further once I have learned the formula that something cannot 
simultaneously both exist and not exists (as the wise Locke has already noted), so am I am not 
                                                        
18 Tittel, Reform, pp. 30-37. 
19 Tittel, Reform, p. 33. 
20 See e.g. C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.81-2. 
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brought any further when one says to me – “act in such a way that you can also will that your maxim 
may become universal.”21 
  
Tittel therefore charges Kant with empty formalism: «Therefore only the form is purely rational; but 
the materials are empirical. However! Without the materials I cannot even imagine myself under an 
empty form.»22 Without reference to experience, the categorical imperative is a purely formal and 
rational principle that cannot decide the morality of maxims, unless we bring in information gained 
by experience. 
 As Fabian Freyenhagen notes, «Hegel is often credited with having formulated this objection 
[i.e. of empty formalism] in its most incisive way.»23 In the Philosophy of Right, for example, Hegel 
makes some remarks that are extremely similar to those of Tittel. From the point of view of Kant’s 
moral philosophy, Hegel argues that 
 
no immanent doctrine of duties is possible. One might indeed bring in material from outside and 
thereby arrive at particular duties, but it is impossible to make the transition to the determination of 
particular duties from the above determination of duty as absence of contradiction, as formal correspondence 
with itself, which is no different from the specification of abstract indeterminacy; and even if such a 
particular content for action is taken into consideration, there is no criterion within the principle for 
deciding whether or not this content is a duty.24 
 
Freyenhagen has very accurately remarked that Hegel’s version of the empty formalism objection, 
taken in its entirety, actually captures a cluster of interrelated objections,25 but that the objection can 
be summarized by three main points: 1) the categorical imperative cannot arrive at a doctrine of 
duties, 2) there is no criterion to test candidate duties, i.e. consistency or contradiction is not a 
helpful criterion for testing duties, and 3) the test that Kant proposes would lead to false positives.26 
As is clear in the passages from the Reform cited above, Tittel’s own early version of the empty 
                                                        
21 Tittel, Reform, p. 14-15. 
22 Tittel, Reform, p. 88. 
23 F. Freyenhagen, Empty, Useless, and Dangerous? Recent Kantian Replies to the Empty Formalism Objection, in «Bulletin of 
the Hegel Society of Great Britain», 63, 2011, pp. 163-186: 163. 
24 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, §135 Remark. 
25 Freyenhagen, Empty, Useless, and Dangerous?, p. 165. 
26 Ibid. 
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formalism objection focuses on the second point, i.e. that the categorical imperative, with its 
proposed criterion of absence of contradiction and rational consistency, cannot help us determine 
which candidate maxims are moral and which are not.27 
 
1.3 - Step Two: The Empiricist Interpretation of the Categorical Imperative 
 
The empty formalism objection is just one of many problems that Tittel sees with Kant’s 
moral philosophy. The empty formalism objection is special, however, because it is the first step in a 
line of argument that leads Tittel to make a number of other significant remarks about the 
categorical imperative. The second step of this line of argument is to suggest that, because the 
categorical imperative faces issues like the empty formalism objection, Kant must have had 
something else in mind as a criterion for moral evaluation, as opposed to the formal and rational 
moral law that uses something similar to the principle of contradiction as such a criterion. In other 
words, because the face-value interpretation of the categorical imperative is problematic, in the spirit 
of charity Tittel proceeds to offer an interpretation of the categorical imperative that gives it meaning.  
Not surprisingly, the meaning that Tittel reads into Kant’s categorical imperative is empirical. 
With respect to the example of false promising, for example, Tittel claims: «But does this law not 
immediately refer to the consequences, which such a maxim, according to its universalization, would 
have for myself and others? Only from the consequences can I first decide whether I can wish and 
will that it [my maxim] become universal or not.»28 Tittel makes similar remarks on Kant’s other 
examples: the example of suicide refers to the anthropological desire of self-love; the example of 
developing one’s talents requires consideration of the many purposes that developing such talents 
would serve; and the example of indifference refers, again, to human needs.29 Tittel’s overall point is 
the same: it is only by referring to information we gain through experience, whether about the 
consequences of acting in certain ways or the empirical nature of human beings, that we can see why 
any of Kant’s examples are immoral. The criterion Kant is using must therefore be something other 
than what he claims it to be. The following passage nicely summarizes Tittel’s line of thought here: 
                                                        
27 It should be mentioned, however, that Tittel touches on both of the other points as well. First, it is a 
consequence of there being no criterion of moral judgement (point 2) that the categorical imperative cannot arrive 
at a doctrine of duties (point 1) (see Tittel, Reform, pp. 33-6, 46, 65, 88). Tittel also occasionally discusses how the 
categorical imperatives would yield false positives (point 3) (see Tittel, Reform, p. 47).  
28 Tittel, Reform, p.14, my emphasis. 
29 Tittel, Reform, p. 32-35. 
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The categorical imperative (so that I say it once and for all), with all of the telltale signs of pure 
reason, seems to me to be a true work of fancy [Spielwerk]. “Act in such a way that you can will that 
your maxim becomes universal” sounds indeed nice and new. However! If one wants meaning and 
not words, then it can mean nothing other than: act in such a way, as you can consider it good and 
beneficial, if all other beings (who could also so act) also in fact so acted. An antecedent concept of 
goodness and benefit, determined from somewhere else, is thereby necessarily presupposed, or the 
entire formula has no meaning. By means of the formula I do not therefore learn what is good; 
rather the formula only tells me in general: “Do that which is good (generally useful).” I am not 
brought a step further by that altered, new-seeming formula: “act in such a way that you can also 
will, that your maxim becomes universal”, than by one of the most well-known principles: “act in 
such a way that through your action and maxim of action perfection is promoted (on the whole and 
taken in general).”30 
 
Tittel makes a number of points in this passage, including the claim that Kant does not define, but 
rather presupposes a conception of the good,31 but the main purpose is to suggest that the 
categorical imperative must be interpreted in empiricist fashion if it is to have any meaning. In 
particular, Tittel suggests that the categorical imperative says nothing other than that we should act 
in such a way that, if all other beings acted similarly, it would be generally good and beneficial.32 
Tittel is of course aware that Kant explicitly denies that the categorical imperative takes beneficial 
                                                        
30 Tittel, Reform, p. 36. 
31 This objection, which we might call the ‘priority of the good’ objection, has been raised by many others, but 
most notably by another of Kant’s early critics, namely Herman Andreas Pistorius in his very early review of the 
Groundwork, see A. Landau, Rezensionen zur Kantischen Philosophie: 1781-87, Bebra, Landau, 1991, pp. 354-367; and B. 
Gesang (Editor), Kants vergessener Rezensent, Hamburg, Meiner, 2007, pp. 26-38. Kant explicitly responds to 
Pistorius’s formulation of the priority of the good objection directly in the second chapter of the Analytic of the 
second Critique, as he states in the Preface at 5:8-9. For a discussion of this objection and Kant’s response, see M. 
Walschots. Kant and Consequentialism in Context: The Second Critique’s Response to Pistorius, in «Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie», forthcoming. 
32 A plausible way in which to read this is that Tittel believes Kant must be interpreted as a consequentialist of the 
utilitarian variety if the categorical imperative is to have any meaning. Indeed, Tittel argues against ethical egoism in 
many places (see Tittel, Reform, p. 22) but it is clear that he gives the categorical imperative a consequentialist 
interpretation. For the argument that both Tittel and Pistorius interpret Kant as an implicit utilitarian and the 
suggestion that Kant responds to this mistaken allegation in the second Critique, see M. Walschots. Kant and 
Consequentialism in Context: The Second Critique’s Response to Pistorius, in «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie», 
forthcoming. 
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consequences into account.33 His point is rather that, despite what Kant may say to the contrary, the 
categorical imperative must nevertheless refer to beneficial consequences if it is to have meaning.34 
 
1.4 - Step Three: Merely a New Formula 
 
It is at this point that Tittel makes the ‘new formula’ objection. If we are forced to interpret 
the categorical imperative along empiricist lines in order to give it meaning, then Kant seems to be 
saying something similar to moral principles we are already know. In the passage above, Tittel 
suggests that the categorical imperative is strikingly similar to «one of the most well-known 
principles», namely Christian Wolff’s principle of perfection: «Do that which makes your condition 
of that of others more perfect; omit what makes it less perfect.»35 But if this is all the categorical 
imperative amounts to, then all Kant is offering is merely a new formula, or new formulation, of an 
old, familiar principle, and nothing new: 
 
if Herr Kant wishes to give his supreme principle of morality only the least applicability, he himself 
must consider purposes and consequences, and needs of human beings, and take all of this from the 
world of experience. How might the astute man, with his pure principle of reason, with which no 
human being – not even himself – could make any progress without the help of experience, 
nevertheless raise himself so far above all experiential philosophers, and dare to make so many bitter 
objections against them? Should then the entire Kantian reform of moral science thus confine itself to a new 
formula? How can an empty formula help, which one wishes to give the appearance of pure 
rationality, but which is entirely unsuitable for use insofar as one does not bolster it with the material 
of experience?36 
 
                                                        
33 See for example Tittel, Reform, p. 7 and 17. 
34 It should be mentioned that Tittel would likely want to interpret any non-empirical principle, not just Kant’s, in 
this way. Eventually, Tittel lays his cards on the table and says that what is absolutely good and desire-worthy as a 
«final end» in itself is «the common world best – human happiness and the highest possible sum of perfections for 
sensing and thinking beings». (Reform, 38) Accordingly, Tittel says that if there were a foundational principle of 
morality it would be: “act in such a way that through your action and disposition, the common world best, the 
well-being of sensible and thinking natures, thus also your own happiness – is preserved and promoted.” (Reform 
38-9) 
35 C. Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, zu Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit, Hildesheim, 
Olms, 2006, §12. 
36 Tittel, Reform, p. 35, emphasis added. 
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In order to make sense of the categorical imperative and lend it ‘applicability’, i.e. in order for it to 
possess a usable criterion of moral evaluation and thus enable it to decide the morality of maxims, 
we need to refer to knowledge from experience, such as the needs of human beings, intentions, and 
consequences. But if we do this, then, according to Tittel, the categorical imperative is nothing new, 
special, or interesting, but is only a new formula, i.e. a new way of expressing a principle we have long 
been familiar with.  
In summary, Tittel’s ‘new formula’ objection is actually the third step of a line of argument 
that he presents in the Reform. First, Tittel argues, among other things, that Kant’s categorical 
imperative is a merely formal and therefore empty rational principle that is meaningless in the sense 
of being incapable of deciding the morality maxims. In a second step, Tittel suggests, in the spirit of 
charity, that the categorical imperative must be interpreted along empiricist lines if it is meaningful. 
If this is what Kant’s principle of morality amounts to, however, then Tittel argues it is only a new 
‘formula’, i.e. a new version of principle we are already familiar with. 
 
2. Kant’s Response to Tittel 
 
Kant sent the text of the Groundwork to his publisher in September 1784, and the book was 
published eight months later in April of 1785.37 As we learn from the Foreword to Tittel’s Reform, 
the commentary was completed around March of 1786 and published soon thereafter, as is 
confirmed by the publication of the first review of Tittel’s commentary, which appeared in May of 
that same year.38 When the Reform appeared in the Spring of 1786, Kant was working on the second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. As we learn from an early advertisement for the B edition, 
published on 21. November 1786, Kant initially intended for it to contain 
 
a Critique of Pure Practical Reason as an addition to the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason in the first 
edition, which will, on the one hand, secure the principle of morality against the objections that have 
been raised or will be raised in the future, and on the other hand, is capable of accomplishing the 
whole of the critical investigations that precede the system of the philosophy of pure reason.39  
                                                        
37 M. Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 277. 
38 See Landau, Rezensionen, pp. 378-80. There were in fact no fewer than seven (!) reviews of Tittel’s Reform itself. 
These have all been reprinted in Landau, Rezensionen, see pp. 378-80; 398-99; 403; 405-6; 407-9; 450-69; and 472-3. 
39 Landau, Rezensionen, pp. 471-2. 
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The ‘Critique of Pure Practical Reason’ never made its way into the B edition of the first Critique, of 
course, which was completed in April of 1787, but instead became the Critique of Practical Reason, 
which appeared in December of 1787 with the year 1788 on the title page.40 There is some 
controversy concerning the exact point in time at which Kant decided to turn the ‘Critique of Pure 
Practical Reason’ into a separate book, and why41, but it is uncontroversial that it was the early critics 
of both the Groundwork and the A edition of the first Critique that contributed to Kant wanting to 
expand upon and clarify his principle of morality.  
Tittel was without a doubt one of these critics. If Kant did not discover Tittel’s commentary 
on his own, we have evidence from Kant’s correspondence that his contemporaries made him aware 
of it. In a letter to Kant from Johann Erich Biester dated June 11, 1786, for example, we learn that 
Kant was planning to defend himself against the objections of both Tittel and Feder: 
 
You write to me of a defense that you want to make against the attacks of Herren Feder and Tittel. 
Like everything from your pen, it will be instructive and useful to the public. […] Every sensible 
person shrugs his shoulders when he sees that a Feder (and Tittel is really only a weak shadow of a 
weak Feder) hopes to educate a Kant. (Br, AA X 457) 
 
Similarly, in a letter dated 17. July, 1786 Ludwig Heinrich Jakob writes to Kant that  
 
The misunderstanding concerning your Metaphysics of Morals seems to be even larger than about 
your Critique. I do not know if the brochure of a certain Tittel is known to you, who wagers to 
judge your Metaphysics, but without understanding, at what your investigation aims. (Br, AA X 462) 
 
As these letters from Kant’s fans indicate, in one way or another Kant was aware of Tittel’s 
commentary soon after it was published, and precisely at the time when he was revising «the system 
of the philosophy of pure reason.» It is thus no surprise that the second Critique contains an explicit 
response to Tittel.42  
                                                        
40 For more details see Klemme, The Origin and Aim of Kant’s Critique of Pure Practical Reason. 
41 See Klemme Origin and Aim, pp. 17-18 for a discussion. 
42 There is actually some disagreement over whether it is Tittel that Kant is responding to in the second Critique, or 
someone else. Mary Gregor, for example, claims that Kant is responding to Johann Friedrich Flatt’s early review of 
the Groundwork in the Tübingische gelehrte Anzeigen, 14. Stück, 16. Feb. 1786 105-122 (see also Landau, Rezensionen, 
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Kant addresses Tittel, without mentioning him by name, in one of the footnotes in the 
Preface over the course of Kant’s efforts to explain how the second Critique responds to his critics. 
After clarifying that the second Critique only presupposes the Groundwork «insofar as this constitutes 
preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty and provides and justifies a determinate formula 
of it» (KpV, AA V 8) Kant says the following in a footnote: 
 
[1] A reviewer who wanted to say something censuring this work hit the mark better than he himself 
may have intended when he said that no new principle of morality is set forth in it but only a new 
formula. [2] But who would even want to introduce a new principle of all morality and, as it were, 
first invent it? [3] Just as if, before him, the world had been ignorant of what duty is or in 
thoroughgoing error about it. [4] But whoever knows what a formula means to a mathematician, 
which determines quite precisely what is to be done to solve a problem and does not let him miss it, 
will not take a formula that does this with respect to all duty in general as something that is 
insignificant and can be dispensed with. (KpV, AA V 8n) 
 
The existing interpretations of this footnote are very incomplete and largely focus on Kant’s 
response in the second sentence only.43 In the remainder of this section I offer an interpretation of 
this footnote in an effort to clarify Kant’s response to Tittel’s ‘new formula’ objection.  
                                                        
277-282). Although Flatt mentions Kant’s «new formula of the supreme principle of morality [neue Formel des 
obersten Grundsatzes der Sittlichkeit]» (Flatt, p. 111) in this review, the essence of Flatt’s objection at this point 
does not concern the categorical imperative as a new formula, but rather with the idea that rational beings are the 
only things that have value in and of themselves, from which Flatt claims that Kant deduces the principle of 
morality. It is therefore unlikely that Kant has Flatt in mind in second Critique footnote at 5:8n. (It should also be 
noted here that Gregor, and almost every modern edition of Gregor’s translation, lists the publication details of 
Flatt’s review incorrectly. The information I have listed above is correct.) Alternatively, Heiner Klemme claims that 
Kant is not referring to Tittel himself, but to a review of Tittel’s Reform (see H. Klemme, Sachanmerkungen, in I. 
Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, edited by H. Klemme and H.D. Brandt, Hamburg, Meiner, 2003, pp. 219-242: 
222-3) Klemme presumably makes this claim because Kant refers to a “reviewer” in the footnote that addresses 
the new formula objection. Both Gregor and Klemme acknowledge, however, that it is Tittel who most precisely 
formulated the ‘new formula’ objection. Given that Kant was aware of Tittel’s Reform, and the fact that it is in this 
book that we find the most thorough description of the objection, it is very unlikely that Kant has anyone other 
than Tittel himself in mind in the second Critique footnote. Indeed, although the Reform is not a ‘review’ in the strict 
sense of the term, as a commentary it is in the spirit of a review of the Groundwork. Tittel himself even describes his 
approach in the Reform as similar to that of many reviews of the time, i.e. as having «followed» Kant «step by step» 
(see Tittel, Reform, pp. 4-5), which might explain why Kant refers to Tittel as a ‘reviewer.’ 
43 See L.W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960, 
p. 57 and 165; G.B. Sala, Kants «Kritik der praktischen Vernunft»: Ein Kommentar, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 2004, p. 65 and 94. Exceptions that offer an interpretation that was formative for what I offer in 
this paper are Bacin, Kant and Feder, pp. 244-7 and Timmermann, Commentary, pp. xii-xiii. 
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 In the first sentence of the footnote [1] Kant describes the objection, namely that the 
Groundwork did not set forth a new principle of morality, but only a new formula. The way in which 
Kant understands this objection will only be clear once we have analysed the rest of the footnote. In 
the second sentence [2], Kant begins his response by admitting that his aim in the Groundwork was 
not to «introduce [einführen]» or «invent [erfinden]» a new principle of all morality. At first glance, this 
might strike readers as odd given that Kant claims in both the Groundwork (see e.g. GMS, AA IV 
441-3) and the second Critique that there is something novel about the categorical imperative that 
«distinguishes it from all other practical principles» (KpV AA V 46), namely autonomy as opposed to 
the heteronomy of all previous practical principles. If we take a closer look at how Kant describes 
his aims in the Groundwork, however, the second sentence is not as odd as it initially appears. In the 
Preface to the Groundwork Kant describes the aim of the book in the following way: 
 
The present groundwork, however, is nothing more than the identification [die Aufsuchung] and 
corroboration [Festsetzung] of the supreme principle of morality, which by itself constitutes a business that 
is complete in its purpose and to be separated from every other moral investigation. (GMS, AA IV 
392.3-6) 
 
The first step of Kant’s response to Tittel is therefore to clarify that the aim of the book was never 
to invent or discover a new principle of morality. On the contrary, as Kant clarifies towards the end 
of the Groundwork’s First Section, aptly entitled «Transition from common to philosophical moral 
rational cognition» (GMS, AA IV 393), the categorical imperative is the principle that «common 
human reason […] always actually has before its eyes and uses as the standard of its judging.» (GMS, 
AA IV 403.34-37) As Kant goes on to argue: «there is thus no need of science and philosophy to 
know what one has to do in order to be honest and good, indeed even to be wise and virtuous.» 
(GMS, AA IV 404.5-7) Common human reason, i.e. pre-philosophical cognition, does not need to 
be taught anything new, philosophy merely «makes it aware of its own principle» (GMS, AA IV 
404.4-5), i.e. identifies [aufsuchen] and establishes or corroborates [festsetzen] the principle it already 
implicitly employs. This explains Kant’s remark in the third sentence [3]: if his aim were to discover 
and invent a new principle of morality for the very first time, he would be implying that the principle 
is completely unfamiliar to everyone, whether on the level of pre-philosophical cognition or 
otherwise. 
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 In the fourth sentence [4] Kant raises the question of the correct definition of a ‘formula 
[Formel]’ and seems to suggest that Tittel might have misunderstood the meaning of this concept. In 
the Reform, Tittel does not have a technical understanding of the concept of a formula, rather he uses 
it as a synonym for a law, rule, or principle. For example, he refers to the principle of non-
contradiction in Locke’s philosophy as a «formula [Formel]».44 Perhaps most clearly, Tittel states in a 
passage already quoted above that a formula, in the sense of a moral rule or law, is just the general 
expression of how we judge in particular cases: 
 
The law is just the general expression, or the abstract entity, wherein what is common to certain 
actions and their consequences is summarized and described out of a multitude of singular cases. 
The general expression, as a formula, both in the theoretical and practical sense (axiom or law), 
always breaks down into the singular concepts and cases, from which they were abstracted; and the 
former reaches not a hair further than the latter.45 
 
Tittel calls the categorical imperative a rule [Regel]46, a law [Gesetz]47 and also a formula [Formel],48 and 
refers to the three main formulations of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork as three 
different formulas [Formeln],49 as Kant does. Thus, for Tittel, a formula is no different from an 
axiom, law, or rule in the sense of a general expression and summarization of particular cases. 
 The fourth sentence of Kant’s response to Tittel in the second Critique footnote seems to 
suggest that Kant has a different definition of a formula [Formel] in mind. In this footnote Kant 
offers one of his clearest definitions of the concept of a formula,50 and seems to assign it a relatively 
technical meaning: he claims that a formula, for a mathematician, is something that «determines 
quite precisely what is to be done to solve a problem and does not let one miss it.» (5:8n) This 
definition suggests that the strict definition of a formula is to be understood along the same lines as 
a hypothetical imperative, namely as representing «the practical necessity of a possible action as a 
means to achieving something else that one wants.» (GMS, AA IV 414.13-15) This might be how 
                                                        
44 Tittel, Reform, p. 15. 
45 Tittel, Reform, p. 14. 
46 Tittel, Reform, p. 33. 
47 Tittel, Reform, p. 33. 
48 Tittel, Reform, p. 39. 
49 Tittel, Reform, p. 49. 
50 The definition offered in this footnote appears prominently in most Lexica of Kant’s terminology. See e.g. S. 
Bacin, Formel, in Kant-Lexikon, edited by M Willaschek, J Stolzenberg, G Mohr, and S Bacin, Berlin, De Gruyter, 
2015, pg. 621-622 
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formulas operate for mathematicians, but we are not concerned about the meaning of formula for 
mathematicians. We want to know what a formula means for moral philosophers, and the 
categorical imperative is meant to be different in kind from hypothetical imperatives, so Kant must 
have something else in mind here. 
Luckily, Kant has other definitions of the concept of a formula than the one presented in the 
footnote under discussion, which make his point in sentence far more clear. In Kant’s lectures on 
logic, for example, he defines a formula as «a rule whose expression serves as a model for 
application» (V-Lo/Wiener, AA XXIV 867). Similarly, in the Jäsche logic formulas are defined as 
«rules whose expression serves as a model for imitation. They are uncommonly useful, by the way, 
for making complicated propositions easier.» (Log, AA IX 77) Kant also offers an extremely clear 
definition in a reflection: «Formula: a rule, whose expression makes application easier and serves as 
an example (model).» (Refl, AA XVI 405) As we can gather from these definitions, generally 
speaking a formula is an abstract expression, or rule, which makes understanding something 
complicated much easier. Appropriately, this is exactly how Kant describes the function of the three 
main «formulae [Formeln]» of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork, namely as «three ways of 
representing the principle of morality», i.e. they «are fundamentally only so many formulae of the 
selfsame law.» (GMS, AA IV 436.8-10) Furthermore, these formulae «obtain access for the moral law» 
and «bring it closer to intuition.» (GMS, AA IV 437.1-4) A formula can make a more complicated 
proposition easer to understand and can enable it to serve as an example or model for imitation and 
application in many ways, and one  way of doing so is if a formula «determines quite precisely what is 
to be done to solve a problem and does not let one miss it.» (KpV, AA V 8n) But, again, this is not 
the only way a formula can accomplish this. More generally, then, a formula is just a way of 
representing something more complicated, like a purely formal law, in a way that makes it more 
accessible to intuition.  
Kant’s definition of a formula in the fourth sentence of the second Critique footnote does 
not therefore make his point very clear, but we are now in a position to understand his overall 
response. In the fourth sentence of the footnote Kant merely reinforces the idea that the categorical 
imperative, or rather its three formulae, are simply three ways of representing the moral law that 
serve as models or examples in order to make this complicated law accessible and closer to intuition. 
Let us now return to the first sentence of the footnote: «A reviewer who wanted to say something 
censuring this work hit the mark better than he himself may have intended when he said that no new 
principle of morality is set forth in it but only a new formula.» (KpV AA V, 8n) Kant is claiming here 
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that, in his attempt to raise an objection, Tittel has pointed out and perhaps clarified an important 
aspect of his aim in the Groundwork. The categorical imperative is not meant to be a newly 
discovered moral principle, rather the three formulae of the categorical imperative are simply ways 
of representing the purely rational and formal moral law that make this law more accessible to 
intuition and capable of application.  
 
3. If Not a New Formula, Then Not Binding 
 
At the beginning of this paper I stated that Tittel presents a line of argument in the Reform 
that has four steps. In the above, I illustrated the first three of these steps: step one is that the 
categorical imperative is empty in the sense that it contains no criterion for deciding the morality of 
maxims; step two claims that in order for the categorical imperative to have a meaningful criterion, 
we have to interpret it in an empiricist way; and step three infers that, if this is the case, then Kant’s 
seemingly new principle of morality is merely a new formula of an empirical principle we have been 
familiar with for a long time. Despite the above-mentioned insults that some of Kant’s fans made 
against Tittel’s intellectual abilities, Tittel is aware that the empiricist interpretation of the categorical 
imperative is not the meaning Kant intended it to have. On the contrary, in the final step of Tittel’s 
line of thought Tittel argues that if the categorical imperative is not an implicitly empiricist principle, 
then the much more serious problem that Kant faces is not emptiness, but the absence of a binding 
force. The existing secondary literature does not offer a consistent picture of the significance of 
Tittel’s objection. Lewis White Beck, for example, argues that Tittel’s objection is not particularly 
serious and falls into the category of criticisms that were «repeatedly made which permitted no 
specific answer because of their blanket character.»51 Stefano Bacin, on the other hand, suggests that 
Tittel’s ‘new formula’ objection points to a more «serious weakness.»52 In this final section of the 
paper I explain the fourth step in the Tittel’s line of argument in order to illustrate the overall 
significance of the new formula objection. I side with Bacin and argue that the new formula 
objection points to a much more serious issue with Kant’s moral philosophy, namely the 
bindingness of morality. 
 Although Tittel’s aim in the Reform is not to describe his own philosophical commitments, 
we learn a lot about them from his criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy. We have seen above that 
                                                        
51 See Beck, Commentary, p. 57. 
52 See Bacin, Kant and Feder, p. 247. 
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Tittel makes it clear in the Reform that he is an empiricist with respect to knowledge. Another 
commitment that he is not shy to advertise is his eudaimonism in ethics.53 Tittel subscribes to two 
views that mark him out as an ethical eudaimonist. First and most importantly, Tittel believes that all 
human motivation is rooted in the pursuit of happiness: «Without a view to well-being and benefit 
the human being cannot act at all.»54 This eudaimonist, but not egoist,55 conception of human 
motivation is extremely important, because for Tittel this conditions the kind of moral principle that 
can apply to human beings: «What is required of the human being, what it should love, must be 
attainable for it.»56 In other words, ‘ought implies can’: if a human being is only capable of acting 
with a view to well-being and benefit, they cannot be required to act in any way other than what 
promotes these ends. Accordingly, the second eudaimonist view that Tittel subscribes to concerns 
the principle of moral appraisal. In the Foreword to the reform, Tittel states that the principle he 
subscribes to is that of «happiness as the principle of morality.»57 Tittel’s eudaimonism therefore 
amounts to general well-being functioning as both the criterion of moral appraisal and as the 
foundation of human action. 
 On the basis of these eudaimonist commitments, Tittel believes that Kant’s moral 
philosophy is not binding on human beings. From the perspective of the eudaimonist, Tittel argues 
that a morality that commands human beings to act without considering their «benefit and 
happiness, pleasure and enjoyment» is «impossible»,58 a «non-thing»59 for human beings, and 
«superhuman.»60 He even says it is «moral slavery»61 to be required to act from duty without 
involving inclination. As a result, Tittel argues that the categorical imperative, which demands that 
we act for the sake of duty alone, is not binding on human beings who necessarily care about both 
their own happiness and that of others. Tittel argues that a pure moral law may be valid for pure 
spirits, like God, but for finite human beings who need happiness, or even for angels who are also 
                                                        
53 See S. Bacin, Kant and Feder on the Will, Happiness and the Aim of Moral Philosophy, in Kant and His German 
Contemporaries: Volume 1: Logic, Mind, Epistemology, Science and Ethics, Edited by Corey Dyck and Falk Wunderlich, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pg. 232-249: 233, for a brief discussion of both Tittel and Feder’s 
eudaimonism. 
54 Tittel, Reform, p. 21. 
55 See Tittel, Reform, p. 22. 
56 Tittel, Reform, p. 22. 
57 Tittel, Reform, p. 6. 
58 Tittel, Reform, p. 39. 
59 Tittel, Reform, p. 26. 
60 Tittel, Reform, p. 22; see also 23, 26, 40-42. 
61 Tittel, Reform, p. 13. 
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not pure spirits, the moral law is not valid.62 If a principle is to have application and be valid for 
human beings, it needs to consider their nature.63 For Tittel, the law is only binding on human 
beings if it promotes their well-being and benefit. 
 In the end, Tittel argues that the Groundwork puts moral science in a bad spot: «Nothing else 
was to be expected from the entire construction and course of the investigation than that, in the 
end, the whole doctrine of morals must be placed in this unfortunate position.»64 This is because 
Tittel believes Kant’s moral philosophy lacks a foundation: 
 
At the conclusion of this deduction it must admittedly result that the most supreme concept of the 
whole doctrine of morals, connected to absolutely nothing and supported by nothing, must 
thoroughly lack support; and that for the person who wishes to know ‘for what?’ and ‘why?’ 
something is duty, only this single and final answer remains: because it is duty – that is why it is 
duty.65 
 
For this reason, Tittel charges Kant with mysticism: «it is obvious that within its boundaries, pure 
duty (pure virtue) for Herr Kant is nothing other than a surrogate for what (in the mystical sense) is 
the pure love of God.»66 For Tittel, mysticism is characterized by the belief that one «should love 
God for his own sake, without thinking that he is well-meaning towards me.»67 «Kantian 
mysticism»68 is similar: «Duty, as duty, I am supposed to love, because it is duty, without a view to 
contentment and happiness.»69 But for Tittel, this means that moral obligation has no foundation. 
Tittel closes his commentary with a scathing remark: 
 
It must of course be entirely incomprehensible how this barren, withered down, skeletal concept of 
duty – separated from all influence on happiness, from everything that could give it appeal, interest, 
                                                        
62 Tittel, Reform, p. 79. 
63 Tittel, Reform, p. 41. 
64 Tittel, Reform, p. 91. 
65 Tittel, Reform, pp. 92-3. 
66 Tittel, Reform, p. 6. 
67 Tittel, Reform, p. 24. 
68 Tittel, Reform, p. 6. 
69 Tittel, Reform, p. 24. In the second Critique, Kant argues that the ‘Typic’ «guards against», i.e. prevents the 
categorical imperative from being interpreted as «mysticism of practical reason» (KpV, AA V 70), but Kant doesn’t 
seem to have Tittel in mind here. The mysticism Kant is concerned with in the Typic is rather the view that «real 
but not sensible intuitions (of an invisible kingdom of God)» (KpV, AA V 71) are the source of moral knowledge. 
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something worthy of loving, and completely stripped – how this concept could ever become an 
effective determining ground for human beings.70 
 
Accordingly, at the end of his line of reasoning, and at the end of the commentary, Tittel claims that 
Kant’s alleged ‘reform’ of moral science, i.e. his attempt at an «improvement of moral science»71 
fails. The last line of the commentary reads: «And that is supposed to be the Groundwork of 
Morals?»72 That Tittel penetrated so deeply into the foundation of Kant’s moral philosophy certainly 
suggests that Tittel was not merely a «weak shadow of a weak Feder», as Biester suggested (Br, AA X 




Kant’s brief response to Tittel’s new formula objection in the second Critique footnote is not 
his only, nor is it his entire response to all of the issues that Tittel raises in the Reform. Indeed, the 
response Kant offers in the footnote is incomplete for a number of reasons. First and foremost, 
Kant still needs to show how the formulas of the categorical imperative are not empty and can decide 
the morality of maxims. Second, it would be in Kant’s interest to clarify the way in which the 
categorical imperative cannot be given an empiricist interpretation, as Tittel has suggested. As it 
turns out, Kant addresses both of these concerns in the second Critique. First, and with respect to 
empty formalism, in the ‘Typic’ section of the Analytic, Kant explains that thinking of the moral law 
as a law of nature is the only way we can use a purely formal law to make judgements about 
empirical cases. In this section Kant attempts to explain how the law of nature is «a type for the 
appraisal of maxims in accordance with moral principle» (KpV, AA V 69), i.e. he argues that thinking 
of the moral law as a law of nature can be used as an effective criterion of moral evaluation. In this 
same section, Kant also explains how his principle is different from an «empiricism of practical 
reason» (KpV, AA V 70), i.e. a theory according to which deciding the morality of maxims is based 
on their empirical consequences. Perhaps most importantly, however, it would be in Kant’s interest 
to clarify the bindingness of the moral law, as this is the most serious of Tittel’s objections. It is well 
known that there is something new, or at the very least different, about Kant’s ‘deduction’ of the 
                                                        
70 Tittel, Reform, p. 93. 
71 Tittel, Reform, p. 8. 
72 Tittel, Reform, p. 93. 
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moral law in the second Critique as opposed to the Groundwork. It might very well be that Tittel 
encouraged Kant to rethink or at least reformulate his attempt to ground the categorical imperative. 
Owen Ware has recently suggested this very point, namely that «Kant’s motive for making the 
doctrine of the Fact of Reason prominent in the second Critique was perhaps a reaction to Tittel’s 
(1786) [Reform].»73 With the above account of the line of thought that Tittel presents in the Reform 
now in hand, we are in a better position to undertake the investigation of this question, but it will 
have to wait for another occasion.74 
                                                        
73 O. Ware, Kant’s deductions of morality and freedom, in «Canadian Journal of Philosophy», 47, 1, pp.116-147: 140. 
74 I would like to thank those in attendance at ‘The Early Critique of Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, a conference held 
in St. Andrews in 2019, for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Special thanks are due to 
Luca Fonnesu, Pauline Kleingeld, Heiner Klemme, Jens Timmermann, John Walsh, and an anonymous referee at 
Studi Kantiani for their helpful feedback. Thanks also to Antonino Falduto for inviting me to participate in the 
conference and for encouraging me to submit to this special issue. 
